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BRIND & RUST V. SULLIVAN: FREE SPEECH AND THE
LIMITS OF A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION
RONALD

I.

J.

KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

T

HE existence of a written constitution is thought by some to place
certain rights, obligations, and duties in a preferred place within a
nation's legal constellation.' Thus, the existence of the First Amendment, with an express guarantee of speech and press rights,2 should

* Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.; B.A., M.A., 1987, Emory University; J.D., LL.M., 1991, Duke University. Former law clerk to the Hon. Frank M. Johnson, Jr.
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

1. One of the leading American proponents of this theory is former Circuit Judge Robert
Bork. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TamPsrsNa OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE

LAW, 118-19, 147 (1990) ("[tlhe absence of a constitutional provision means the absence of a
power of judicial review"); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396-97, 1396 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J.) (opining that courts should not recognize or enforce rights that lack a textual

foundation). However, the notion that written provisions (and particularly constitutional provisions) somehow elevate particular rights from nontextual rights is relatively commonplace in law.
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874-76, 2884-

85 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that as a general matter courts should enforce only
rights with a textual foundation in the Constitution); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-19 (1988)
(holding that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment precludes a state from permit-

ting a minor to testify via closed circuit television); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 555-56
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that a written constitution provides a greater degree of protection for enumerated rights); see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 388 (1972) (Douglas J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should only

exercise the powers given it in the text of the Constitution); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 520-27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (lamenting the Supreme Court's decisions to recognize

unenumerated rights and arguing that only the text of the Constitution establishes enforceable
rights); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 737 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (noting
that the powers of the United States government are fixed "by a written constitution").
Several leading British scholars share Judge Bork's view that a written constitution is necessary to ensure the adequate protection of individual rights and liberties. See, e.g., RONALD
DWORKIN, A BILL OF RIGHrs FOR BRITAIN 17-23 (1990) (arguing that Britain needs a written bill
of rights); Anthony Lester, The Constitution: Decline and Renewal, in THE CHANoNo CONSTITUTION 345, 353-56 (Jeffery Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 1989) (arguing that Britain needs a
written bill of rights to ensure protection of civil rights and liberties); Jim Murdoch, The Rights
of Public Assembly and Procession, in HUMAN RIoTrs: FRoM RIETORIC TO REALITY 173-82, 19395 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 1986) (same); HARRY STREET, FREEDOM, TilE INDIVMUAL AND THE
LAW 284-85 (1963) (same). But cf STREET, supra, at 287 ("Our judges may be relied on strenuously to defend some kinds of freedom.").
2. The First Amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress or grievances." U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
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provide (at least nominally) greater protection for those liberties than
would otherwise exist in the absence of such a provision. Quite often,
this seemingly unobjectionable proposition holds true.'
However, the proposition is not as self-evident as one might assume. Counter examples do exist. 4 The presence of a written constitutional guarantee of a particular right does not automatically mean
that courts will afford the right greater solicitude, and the absence of
a written constitutional provision does not preclude the protection of
a particular liberty.5
This is not to suggest that the absence of a specific textual provision
protecting freedom of speech and the press has no affect on the disposition of cases raising such claims.6 The point is more limited-the
presence or absence of a textual guarantee of speech and press rights
7
is not as sure a predictor of actual outcomes as one might expect .
In a pair of cases, the British House of Lords and the Supreme
Court of the United States have demonstrated the limits of written
constitutional provisions. Examined conjunctively, these cases show
that the protection of free speech or a free press may not be as extensive as one would assume under a written constitution and may, surprisingly, be more extensive than one would expect in the absence of

such a document.

3. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); cf. Barnes v.
Glenn Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (holding that state law prohibiting totally nude dancing did
not violate the First Amendment); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (holding that
law prohibiting burning of draft card did not violate First Amendment).
4. Carmpare Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Brind, [1991] 1
App. Cas. 696, 748-49, 750-51 (appeal taken from C.A.) (recognizing, but not applying, right of
free speech) with Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1771-76 (1991) (rejecting speech claim by
medical doctors); National Press Club v. Commission on Elections, The Law. Review 36 (March
31, 1992) (Philippines) (holding that Philippine constitutional free speech interest does not protect political speech in newspapers); Regina v. Butler, 89 D.L.R.4th 449, 488-89 (1992) (Can.)
(holding that Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not protect certain scatological
materials deemed to demean women).
5. THE FEDEALIST No. 84, at 575-81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961);
see James Madison, Address Before the United States House of Representatives (June 8, 1789),
reprinted in 5 THE WRImTIGS O JAMES MADISON 370-89 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904); cf. Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON
428, 429 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975) ("I will now add what I do not like. First, the omission
of a bill of rights .... ").
6. See WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 47-48, 113
n.73 (1984) [hereinafter VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT].
7. See infra notes 95-142 and accompanying text.
8. Compare Brind, 1199t] 1 App. Cas. at 748-49, 750-51 (recognizing, but not applying,
right of free speech) with Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1775-76 (rejecting speech claim by doctors).
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In February 1991, in Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home
Dep't, Ex parte Brind,9 the British House of Lords upheld a ban on
broadcasts featuring in-person appearances by representatives of several designated political affiliates of allegedly terrorist organizations.
The ban went into effect in 1988, pursuant to an administrative order
issued by then-Home Secretary Douglas Hurd. 10
In the summer of that same year, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided Rust v. Sullivan," a case involving policy concerns
largely similar to those at issue in Brind. In Rust, the Court reached a
result parallel with that reached in Brind, the First Amendment notwithstanding. 12
To be sure, the precise questions presented in Brind and Rust were
not identical. 3 The approach that the Supreme Court and the House
of Lords took in deciding the respective cases, however, belies the
proposition that the existence or non-existence of a written speech
clause determined the result in either case. A comparison of Brind and
Rust shows that the existence of a written constitution is not a safe
4
predictor of outcomes in actual cases.'
In Brind, the House of Lords, sitting as a court of law in a nation
with no written constitution, appeared to import a "compelling state
interest" test into a routine review of an administrative regulation, all
in the name of protecting the "fundamental right" of free speech. 5
More or less concurrently, the United States Supreme Court, hearing
an appeal challenging the legality of a federal regulation, declined to
apply seemingly well-settled First Amendment law,1 6 and in the proc-

9. [1991] 1 App. Cas. at 752-56.
10. See id. at 711-15; see also Patricia Wynn Davies, Law Lords Uphold Media Bar on
IRA, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 8, 1991, at AIO (discussing the ban and the challenge brought against

it by several broadcast journalists).
11. 111S. Ct. at 1759.
12. Id. at 1775-76.
13. See infra notes 48-56, 95-105 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Brind and
Rust).

14.

Or, more precisely, that the existence of a written constitution does not always ensure

that the seemingly valid invocation of a right can be interposed to block the application of gov-

ernment proscriptions against the exercise of the right.
15.

See Regina" v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Brind, [19911 1 App.

Cas. 696, 748-49, 750, 763 (appeal taken from C.A.); cf. BoR, supra note 1, at 147.
16. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-08 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250

(1957); id. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Young Women's Christian Ass'n of Princeton v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1063 (D.N.J. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1402 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 989; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163, 166 (1973) (recognizing the

constitutional importance of the professional judgment of a physician in making medical decisions); see generally William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in
the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, 53 LAW & CONTEMP.

PRoas. 79 (1990) [hereinafter Van Alstyne, Historical Review].
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ess weakened both the scope and strength of the First Amendment.17
Given these developments, one could reasonably challenge the proposition that written foundational documents are either a prerequisite to
or a guarantor of personal liberties in general, or free speech in particular.
Part II of this Article individually examines Brind and Rust. In particular, the Article gives careful consideration to the novelty of the
"law lords"' 8 seeming importation of a "compelling state interest"
test.
Part III also examines whether the results in Brind and Rust were in
any way contingent on the presence or absence of a written constitutional guarantee of free speech. This section suggests some possible
reasons for the level of solicitude accorded free speech claims in the
United States and Great Britain. If the results in particular cases cannot be explained, then the presumed value of a written constitutional
document should be reevaluated, and perhaps revised. Finally, Part
III takes up the implications of Brind and Rust for the indeterminacy
argument advanced by some in the legal academy.
In their battle against normativism in the law, members of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement have identified the "indeterminacy
problem" as one of the central bulwarks of their argument that law is
mostly politics. 19 Some within the CLS movement argue that law is
not simply indeterminate in particular applications, but rather is indeterminate at its "core." 2 0 A legal system's foundational principles
should be the surest place to find stability and determinism; thus,
Brind and Rust lend some support to the CLS claim that law is fundamentally "indeterminate." However, in Part III, this Article argues
that written constitutional provisions, coupled with strong community
traditions, can at least constrain indeterminacy.
II.

BRIND AND RUST: SIMILAR CASES, SIMILAR RESULTS

The United States and Great Britain are distinct societies.2 Despite
a common legal heritage, the legal systems of the two nations have
17. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1771-76 (1991); see also infra notes 129-142 and
accompanying text.
18. A "law lord" is a member of the House of Lords who is appointed for life (he or she is
not necessarily a member of the peerage) and who sits in decision over the appeals taken from
the lower British courts. The House of Lords, as a whole, does not sit to decide cases. Rather,
the small cadre of law lords discharge this function. P. S. ATIYAHI & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM
AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 269 (1987).
19. See Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515,
1524, 1538-39 (1991) [hereinafter Tushnet, CLS]; Girardeau A. Spann, Baby Mand the Cassandra Problem, 76 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1735 (1988); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36
STAN. L. REV. 57, 114 (1984).
20. Gordon, supranote 19, at 114.
21. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Note, Autonomy, Community, and Traditionsof Lib-
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developed quite differently. 2 The absence of a written constitution, or
a statutory bill of rights in Great Britain, is perhaps one of the most
salient differences between the two legal systems.
Given the absence of a textual guarantee of free speech rights in
British domestic law, one would not expect the British House of Lords
to decide a free speech case in the same manner as would the United
States Supreme Court.23 Quite reasonably, one would expect the Supreme Court to treat invocations of the right of free speech with
greater solicitude than the House of Lords, an appellate court that
operates in a nation where the legislature is sovereign 4 and the power
of judicial review can charitably be described as "weak. 2' 5 Paradoxically, in spite of its institutional limitations, the contemporary House
26
of Lords seems willing to push at the margins to protect free speech,
whereas the United States Supreme Court appears willing to permit
the federal government to purchase speech rights through the creative
27
exercise of Congress' taxing and spending powers.
Madison once observed that a Bill of Rights is "useful" but not
"essential.'"' Brind and Rust together suggest that Madison's observation may be more true than one might think.

erty: The Contrast of British and American Privacy Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1398, 1399-1400,
1446.
22.

ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 18, at 222-39, 408-09.

23. A particularly good example of this is the Handyside case. Handyside involved the British government's attempt to suppress "The Little Red Schoolbook" because of its somewhat
frank discussion of sexual matters. This effort ultimately succeeded, even though the book circulated freely elsewhere in Western Europe. Handyside v. United Kingdom, I Eur. H.R. Rep. 737,
740-43, 758-60 (1976).
24.

ATrYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 18, at 227-28, 298-306; STREET, supra note I, at 286;

see Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas. 696,
715 (C.A.).
25. ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 18, at .299-306; STREET, supra note 1, at 309-11; Colin
Mellors, Governments and the Individual- Their Secrecy and His Privacy, in PRIVACY 93 (John
B. Young ed., 1978); Frank Dowrick, Council of Europe: Juristic Activity 1974-86: Part 1, 36
INT'L & Coup. L.Q. 878, 888 (1987); see also Sheila Rule, Group Says Press Freedom is Declining in Britain, N.Y. Timts, Oct. 19, 1990, at 7A; Joe Rogaly, Why Britain Should Copy Germany, THE FINANCIAL TimEs, July 13, 1990, § I, at 16; James Atlas, Thatcher Puts A Lid on
Censorship in Britain, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 5, 1989, § 6, at 36.
26. Indeed, recent cases suggest that it will afford free speech judicial protection to the
extent consistent with the constitutional role of the British judiciary. See Brind, [1991] i App.
Cas. at 748-49, 751; see also Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers, [1992] 3 W.L.R.
28, 48, 56-58, 63-65 (C.A.).
27. See Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991) (noting that although doctors are
required to spout the party line from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) as a
condition of participation in Title X clinics, participating doctors need not represent the party
line as their own professional opinion); Title X Pregnancy Counseling Act of 1991, S. 323, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991).
28. James Madison, Address Before the United States House of Representatives (June 8,
1789), reprinted in 5 THE WRrrINGs OF JAMES MADISON 370-89 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904).
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B'rind: IncorporatingFree Speech Values Absent a Constitutional
Mandate

England, unlike the United States, has no written constitution.29
Consequently, the English courts do not possess a direct textual command to consider free speech claims. The absence of a written constitution containing a guarantee of free speech no doubt is in part
responsible for the English judiciary's failure to vindicate free speech
and free press claims routinely.30 However, this explanation may be a
bit too facile.31
1. Free Speech as a Canon of Statutory Interpretationand as a
Restraint on Administrative Discretion
In Great Britain, the citizen's interest in free speech stems from
community tradition rather than legal fiat. 3" Although there is no writ-

29. Great Britain has a "constitution," albeit an unwritten one. Unlike the U.S. Constitution with its Bill of Rights, the British Constitution concerns itself exclusively with the division
of powers among the Crown, Parliament, and the judiciary. See A. W. Bradley, The Sovereignty
of Parliament-in Perpetuity?, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 25, 27-29 (Jeffrey Jowell &
Dawn Oliver eds., 1989); Lester, supra note i; STANLEY DE SMITH & RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3-14 (6th ed. 1989); J. A. Jolowicz, The Judicial Protection
of Fundamental Rights Under English Law in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE-TILBURG LAw LECTURES 5-6
(Dr. B.S. Markensinis & J.H.M. Willems eds., 1980); STREET, supra note 1, at 11, 283-89; see
also Legislation on Human Rights: A Discussion Document (P) 2.01-05 (Home Office 1976).
30. See, e.g., Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), [1990] 1 App. Cas. 109,
156-59, 178 (C.A.). (the so-called "Spycatcher" case); cf. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 14
Eur. H.R. Rep. 229, 240-44 (1991) (holding that contempt orders in one of the "Spycatcher"
cases violated the right of free speech under the European Convention on Human Rights); Observer & Guardian v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 153, 174-83 (1991) (holding that
temporary injunction violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights); Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 266-67, 275-82 (1979) (holding that British
law of contempt could not be applied to impose a prior restraint on the Times' publication of
articles on the thalidomide disaster, despite the existence of pending lawsuits). The Sunday
Times cases are examples of litigants with free speech claims taking their complaints to an extranational tribunal to vindicate their speech rights. See generally Krotoszynski, supra note 21, at
1420-26, 1430.
31. See Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't Exparte Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas.
696, 748-49, 751 (appeal taken from C.A.); see also Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers, [1992] 3 W.L.R. 28, 48, 56-58, 63-65 (C.A.) (incorporating freedom of speech into the
English law of torts to preclude local government from recovering for libel). fn particular, Lord
Bridge seems to he applying a "compelling state interest" test to determine whether the ban on
in-person broadcasts of the Irish Republican Army representatives was "reasonable" for purposes of reviewing the administrative action. Brind, [199111 App. Cas. at 748-49.
32. Lord Goff perhaps explained this best in GuardianNewspapers:
I can see no inconsistency between English law . . . and (Alrticle 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. This is scarcely surprising, since we may pride ourselves on the fact that freedom of speech has existed in this country perhaps as long
as, if not longer than, it has existed in any other country in the world. The only difference is that, whereas [A]rticle 10 of the Convention, in accordance with its avowed

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1

ten provision of law securing a "right" of free speech in British domestic law, the English judiciary has demonstrated a willingness to
address free speech claims substantively. Thus, the casual observer
would be mistaken if, upon discovering the absence of a written guarantee of free speech, he immediately drew the conclusion that freedom
of speech as an autonomy interest lacks currency.
The absence of a textual provision undoubtedly circumscribes the
British judiciary's ability to vindicate speech interests.3 3 Historically
the British courts have deferred to Parliamentary acts regard!ess of
the judiciary's appraisal of the wisdom of Parliament's action.3 4 Consistent with the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, the British judiciary does not possess the constitutional authority to reject an act of
Parliament, so long as Parliament promulgated the act properly. 5 Ju-

dicial review, in the strong United States form,3 6 simply does not exist
in Britain. Thus, the Britiph judiciary, in the absence of a Parliamentary command to vindicate speech rights, is limited to considering the
tradition of favoring speech rights only at the margins-for example,
37
as a consideration in issues involving statutory interpretation.
Any analysis of the strength of free speech interests in English law
must begin with the frank recognition that if Parliament acts clearly

purpose, proceeds to state a fundamental right and then to qualify it, we in this country (where everybody is free to do anything, subject only to the provisions of the law)
proceed rather upon an assumption of freedom of speech, and turn to our law to
discover the established exceptions to it.
Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), [19901 1 App. Cas. 109, 283 (appeal
taken from C.A.). Of course, Lord-Goff conveniently failed to mention that Parliament's ability
to proscribe speech is unlimited. In light of this fact, his observation is somewhat circular: in
Britain, anyone is free to say what they wish anywhere, anytime, unless there is a legal prohibition against the particular speech. However, this proposition is just as true in North Korea or
Yemen as it is in England.
33. Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas. at 767.
34. See, e.g., Regina v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, Ex parte Rossminster Ltd., [19801 1
App. Cas. 952 (appeal taken from C.A.); see also AryMAH & SUMMERS, supra note 18, at 46-47,
100-12, 267-69; STREET, supra note 1, at 283-84.
35. ATIyAI & StUMERS, supra note 18, at 46-47, 269-70, 299.
36. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
37. Brind, [19911 1 App. Cas. at 761-62. The British judiciary's use of free speech as a
background consideration when considering the scope of parliamentary enactments is entirely
analogous to its use of privacy as a legal canon. See Krotoszynski, supra note 21, at 1413-15,
1425. When faced with an ambiguous parliamentary command, the British judiciary will consider vindicating free speech claims. Brind, [19911 1 App. Cas. at 748-50, 763; see also Krotoszynski, supra note 21, at 1413-15, 1425. Likewise, in the absence of a clear parliamentary
command, the British courts are willing to incorporate free speech values into the common law.
See, e.g., Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers, [1992] 3 W.L.R. 28, 48-49, 53-54,
56, 64-65 (C.A.). However, where Parliament speaks with a clear voice, the British judiciary will
not interpose the community's tradition of free speech to thwart the parliamentary command.
See Brind, [19911 1 App. Cas. at 715 (C.A.).
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and unambiguously, a claim of privilege under some notion of free
speech will fail in the British domestic courts.38 This illustrates the
most obvious effect of a textual speech clause: such provisions legitimate-and often necessitate-judicial review of legislative enactments
for consistency with the asserted speech right. At the outset, then, this
Article concedes that the absence of an analog to the First Amendment in British domestic law substantially restricts the ability of the
British judiciary to consider free speech claims on the merits. In the
vast majority of cases, any claim that an act of Parliament unduly
infringes legitimate speech rights must be heard (if at all) by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasborg, France.3 9
However, there are exceptions to this general proposition. First, if
an act of Parliament is ambiguous, the British courts are free to interpret the act consistently with the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).1° The ECHR contains a
free speech provision, which may be raised in the British domestic
4
courts as a textual basis for the vindication of free speech claims. '

38. See Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), [1990] 1 App. Cas. 109, 156-59,
178, 203, 218-20, 256, 283-84; (1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1286, 1296-97 (H.L.).
39. Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas. at 759-62, 717-18; see P. VAN DuK & G.J.H. VAN HooF,
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EutROPEA CONVENTION ON HumAN RIGHTS 10-18, 91-92, 456
(1984); R. Higgins, United Kingdom, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN Domsesc LAw 123, 124-25,
129-30, 134-35, 137 (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987); Krotoszynski, supra note
21, at1415-18, 1420-21.
40. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (1955) [hereinafter ECHRI; see Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas. at
761; In Re K.D., [1988] 1 App. Cas. 806, 813-15, 823-25, 828-30 (appeal taken from C.A.); see
also Krotoszynski, supra note 21, at 1425.
41. Article 10 of the ECHR provides:
I. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent states from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television, or cinema enterprises.
2.The exercise of these freedoms, since itcarries
with itduties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
ECHR, art. 10, reprinted in Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas. at 760.
Quite obviously, section 2 creates exceptions to the general rule which could, in the abstract,
justify a wide range of restrictions on free expression. Such restrictions would probably not pass
muster under contemporary First Amendment standards. Compare Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (holding that statute
imposing financial burden on speakers because of speech content was unconstitutional) and Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (prohibiting the application of prior restraints on the press)
with Br/nd, [1991] 1 App. Cas. at 749, 751, 759, 763, 765 (upholding content restrictions on

10
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Thus, when a statutory provision is ambiguous, British courts will
have recourse to Article 10 of the ECHR to help determine the proper
42
meaning of the provision.
However, the thesis of this Article is that a written constitutional
provision is not a safe predictor of outcomes in cases involving free
speech rights. Recourse to Article 10 of the ECHR does not materially
advance this thesis; an analysis of the effectiveness of Article 10 in the
British courts fails to demonstrate that the British courts will consider
speech interests in the absence of any textual command.
The British judiciary possesses the power to consider speech claims
in another context: review of administrative regulations. Parliamentary acts sometimes require implementing regulations, 4 and those regulations are subject to judicial review.
In Britain, as in the United States, judicial review of administrative
regulations is not plenary." A reviewing court's discretion is either
limited by the terms of the act conferring the authority on the agency
to promulgate regulations, or, in the absence of a textual statutory
45
limitation, to a standard of reasonableness.
When reviewing the exercise of administrative discretion, recourse
to the ECHR is not mandatory. 46 Thus, unlike cases in which a court
engages in statutory interpretation-in such circumstances the British
domestic courts must have recourse to the ECHR to resolve statutory
ambiguities-recourse to the ECHR is entirely within the discretion of
the administrative decisionmaker. 4 7 In consequence, when a British
court reviews an administrative regulation, there is no textual source
for the protection of speech rights on which the reviewing court may
rely. Nevertheless, the British judiciary has seemingly incorporated
free speech values into its review of administrative regulations.

mass media) and Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), [1990] 1 App. Cas. at 109
(restraining publication of book) and Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245
(1979) (overturning prior restraint the United Kingdom imposed on newspaper).
42. The ECHR is not directly applicable in Great Britain and does not have the effect of
law in British domestic courts. Consequently, the British domestic courts refuse to consider the
treaty, except as an aid in the interpretation of ambiguous statutes. Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas. at
760-62.
43. ArIYA & SutMEs, supra note 18, at 61-62, 299-300, 322-32.

44.

See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 841-42, 863-

65 (1984).
45. Brind, 11991] 1 App. Cas. at 757-59; Council for Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the
Civil Serv., [19851 App. Cas. 374, 410 (appeal taken from C.A.); Associated Provincial Picture
Houses v. Wednesbury Corp., (1948] 1 K.B. 223, 230 (C.A.) (holding that an administrative
regulation may not stand if it is "so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have
come to it"); see SIR WILLInAM WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 388-462 (6th ed. 1988); see also
ATrtAH & SUMMERs, supra note 18, at 61 & n.72.
46. Brind, [19911 1 App. Cas. at 761-62; Krotoszynski, supra note 21, at 1420-25.
47. Brind, [1991] App. Cas. at 762.
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Brind and Judicially Created Speech Interests

In Brind, the British judiciary had to decide whether an administrative regulation proscribing the in-person broadcast of any message by
an official representative of certain allegedly terrorist political
organizations" exceeded the lawful authority of the government 49 minister who promulgated the regulations.
Then-Home Secretary Douglas Hurd promulgated the directive pur-

suant to the Broadcasting Act of 1981,1 0 which authorized the Home
Secretary to establish restrictions on domestic publicly-owned broadcasters. The directive requires the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA):

48. Including Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein, and the Ulster Defence Association. Brind,
[1991] 1 App. Cas. at 755. Sinn Fein and Republican Sinn Fein are organizations committed to
the reunification of Ireland, and historically have not proven averse to the use of force in their
attempts to further this objective. The Ulster Defence Association is committed to the continued
unification of Northern Ireland with the United Kingdom, and has proven itself equally receptive
to the use of force. See generally David Remick, A Reporter At Large: Belfast Confetti, NEW
YORKER, Apr. 25, 1994, at 58 (discussing the shared propensity for terrorist violence on the part
of republican and unionist paramilitary groups in Norther Ireland).
49. See F. W. MAITLAND, TnE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 387-405 (1908) (discussing the composition and historical development of the "government").
50. Section 29(3) of the Broadcasting Act, in relevant part, provides:
Subject to subsection (4), the Secretary of State may at any time by notice in writing
require the Authority [the IBA] to refrain from broadcasting any matter or classes of
matter specified in the notice; and it shall be the duty of the Authority to comply with
the notice.
In turn, section 4(l) of the Broadcasting Act provides:
It shall be the duty of the Authority to satisfy themselves that, so far as possible, the
programmes broadcast by the Authority comply with the following requirements [including] - (a) that nothing is included in the programmes which offends against good
taste or decency or is likely to encourage or incite to crime or to lead to disorder or to
be offensive to public feeling.
reprinted in Brind, [19911 1 App. Cas. at 752-53. Subsection (l)(b) and (l)(f) provide, respectively, that the Authority must provide news programming and that programming relating to
political matters be impartial.
Although these media restrictions may initially seem incredible to American eyes, two mitigating considerations apply. First, the provisions of the Broadcasting Act apply to a public entity,
not a private concern. Mandating editorial neutrality is at least arguably less odious in this circumstance. But cf, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding government requiring or forbidding newspaper to publish specified matter is unconstitutional).
Second, insofar as a government subsidy of the speech is involved, it is quite conceivable that the
First Amendment would not stand as any impediment to a like scheme of regulation, for say, the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting. See Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991). Consistent with Rust, so long as the journalists were not required to represent that the views they
expressed were their own views, see Rust, I II S. Ct. at 1776, the government could most assuredly regulate the content and editorial policies of the publicly-owned broadcast outlet. The purpose of setting forth the statute is primarily to show that the Home Secretary seemingly held
broad discretion in regulating the content of broadcasts through either the BBC or IBA.
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to refrain from broadcasting any matter which consists of or
includes-any words spoken, whether in the course of an interview
or discussion or otherwise, by a person who appears or is heard on
the programme in which the matter is broadcast where-(a) the
person speaking the words represents or purports to represent an
organisation specified in paragraph 2 below or (b) the words support
or solicit or invite support for such an organisation, other than any
matter specified in paragraph 3 below."
The ban applies only to certain organizations:
The organisations referred to in paragraph 1 above are-(a) any
organisation which is for the time being a proscribed organisation
for the purposes of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1984 or the Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act 1978; and (b) Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein and
the Ulster Defence Association. 2
Finally, paragraph three limits the applicability of paragraph one:
The matter excluded from paragraph 1 above is any words spoken(a) in the course of proceedings in Parliament, or (b) by or in
support of a candidate at a parliamentary, European parliamentary
or local election pending that election. 3
54
The ban also does not apply to purely fictional works.
Consistent with the terms of the directive, the broadcast media can
report the words of an official representative of a proscribed organization; indeed, using actors, they may even recreate the statement.55

51. Directive of the Home Secretary (Oct. 19, 1988), reprintedin Brind, [1991) 1 App. Cas.
at 711 (C.A.).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Letter from Mr. C.L. Scoble, Office of the Home Secretary, to the BBC (Oct. 24,
1988), reprintedin Brind, [19911 1 App. Cas. at 753-54.
55. The Home Secretary's Office made this clear in an explanatory letter:
[Tjhe correct interpretation (and that which was intended) is that [the directivel applies only to direct statements and not to reported speech, and that the person caught
by the notice is the one whose words are reported and not the reporter or presenter
who reports them. Thus the notice permits the showing of a film or still picture of the
initiator speaking the words together with a voice-over account of them, whether in
paraphrase or verbatim. We confirmed that programmes involving the reconstruction
of actual events, where actors use the verbatim words which had been spoken in actuality, are similarly permitted.
Letter from Mr. C.L. Scoble, Office of the Home Secretary, to the BBC (Oct. 24, 1988) (explaining the regulation's intended scope) reprinted in Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas. at 753-54.
A hypiothetical demonstrates the absurdity of the regulation. Under the ban, a show styled
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The directive thus erects a prior restraint 6 against the broadcasting of
statements by certain persons, unless the statements were made incident to an election or are part of a fictional work.
The House of Lords' standard of review for the Home Secretary's
action was quite modest: the sole question before the court was
whether a reasonable administrator could reasonably have promulgated the regulation at issue." The House of Lords does not exercise
plenary review of an administrator's choice among policy options;
rather, the Lords are limited to reviewing a decision to ensure that it
was not wholly arbitrary.58 Lord Ackner explained that unlike run-ofthe-mill legal cases in which the courts exercise "appellate" jurisdiction, that is, the power to review a trial court's decision on the merits
without regard to the lower court's disposition of the legal issues, the
court's review of an administrator's exercise of discretion is merely
"supervisory." 9
Despite the court's admittedly modest scope of review, four of the
five law lords hearing the case strongly suggested in dicta that they
would reject a regulation regulating speech more aggressively; a more
stringent regulation of speechw6 would be sufficiently "perverse" to
"Gardening with Sinn Fein" would be prohibited if the show were hosted by an official representative of Sinn Fein and the gardening tips were sanctioned by the group. However, if an actor
recreated the Sinn Fein programming or a broadcaster used a voice-over to convey the message,
the ban would not apply. Likewise, a suitably sinister actor could recreate a terrorist communication, and such programming could be broadcast with impunity. (Although, the actual speaker
could presumably be held accountable for threats of violence).
56. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716-720 (1931). Prior restraints are highly disfavored instruments under the Supreme Court's longstanding First Amendment jurisprudence.
Whether this will remain the case under the Rehnquist Court may be open to some doubt, and
not without cause. See, e.g., Cable News Network v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976, 976 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should not have denied certiorari to determine
whether a prior restraint was constitutional).
57. Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas. at 748, 751, 757-58, 764-66; see also Associated Provincial
Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1947] 2 All E.R. 680, 683 (C.A.).
58. Brind, [199111 App. Cas. at 748-49, 757-58.
59. Id.at 757.
Where Parliament has given to a minister or other person or body a discretion, the
court's jurisdiction is limited, in the absence of a statutory right of appeal, to the
supervision of the exercise of that discretionary power, so as to ensure that it has been
exercised lawfully. It would be a wrongful usurpation of power by the judiciary to
substitute its [own view], the judicial view, on the merits and on that basis to quash
the decision.
Id. For an administrative law analog in the United States, see Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 864-66 (1984) (deferring to the Environmental
Protection Agency's interpretation of the Clean Air Act).
60. For instance, an administrative regulation that prohibited media outlets from propagating the advocacy of the reunification of Ireland as treason against the Crown would presumably
be beyond an administrator's power in the absence of an express parliamentary delegation of
authority to promulgate such a regulation. See Brind, [19911 1 App. Cas. at 748-49, 750, 757,
763.
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fail the "reasonableness" test. 6'
Among the law lords, Lord Bridge is the strongest proponent of
free speech as a normative value in the process of judicial review of
the exercise of discretionary administrative authority. 62 After noting
that the court lacked authority to consider whether the regulation was
consistent with Article 10 of the ECHR, Lord Bridge explained that
"[I] do not accept that this conclusion means that the courts are powerless to prevent the exercise by the executive of administrative discretions, even when conferred, as in the instant case, in terms which are
on their face unlimited, in a way which infringes fundamental human
rights." 63 He continued:
In exercising the power of judicial review we have neither the
advantages nor the disadvantages of any comparable code [referring
to the ECHR] to which we may refer or by which we are bound. But
again, this surely does not mean that in deciding whether the
Secretary of State, in the exercise of his discretion, could reasonably
impose the restriction he has imposed on the broadcasting
organisations, we are not perfectly entitled to startfrom the premise
that any restrictionof the right to freedom of expression requires to
be justified and that nothing less than an important competing public
interest will be sufficient to justify it.6

Lord Bridge observed that the "primary judgment as to whether the
particular competing public interest justifies the particular restriction
6
imposed" is within the administrative decisionmaker's province.
However, the British courts "are entitled to exercise a secondary judgment by asking whether a reasonable Secretary of State, on the material before him, could reasonably make that primary judgment."
Applying the test he proposed, Lord Bridge, joined by Lord Roskill,
concluded that the restriction at issue furthered an important public
interest, and that a reasonable administrator therefore could adopt the
regulation. 6'

61. See id.at751.
62. Opinions of the House of Lords, unlike the Supreme Court, are issued seriatim, with
each law lord on a particular panel holding forth individually. However, it is not unusual for a
lord to write a short opinion that simply concurs in the opinion of another panel member. See,
e.g., Brind, [19911 1 App. Cas. at 749-50 (concurring opinion of Lord Roskill).
63. Id. at 748.
64. Id. at 748-49 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 749.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 749-50.
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Although ostensibly cabined within the confines of the "reasonable
administrator/reasonable conclusion" test, Lord Bridge's opinion
promulgates a relatively stout framework for applying that test: "an
important competing public interest" is necessary to justify "any restriction" on "the right to freedom of expression. ' 6 This test sounds
somewhat like the Supreme Court's "compelling state interest" test,
used in cases such as Boos v. Barry.69 To be sure, Lord Bridge's "important competing public interest" test appears to be at least marginally less protective than the "compelling state interest" test, insofar as
''compelling" connotes a sense of urgency not inherent in the words
"important competing." Regardless of the relative strength of the
test, Lord Bridge's opinion is significant because it demonstrates that
absent any written document providing a textual basis for the protection of speech interests, a law lord is prepared to promulgate de novo
a standard for the protection of speech interests, and moreover, a
standard with potential bite.
Lord Bridge and Lord Roskill were not the only members of the
Brind panel who gave voice to concerns over the protection of free
speech. Lord Templeman expressed what Lord Bridge merely implied:
"My Lords, freedom of expression is a principle of every written and
unwritten democratic constitution." ' 70 Lord Templeman ultimately
concluded that "the interference with freedom of expression" caused
by the regulation was "minimal" and that "the reasons given by the
Home Secretary [were] compelling." ' 7' Like Lord Bridge, Lord Templeman decried engaging in judicial review beyond ensuring that the
"reasonable administrator/reasonable decision" standard has been
satisfied. 2 However, according to Lord Templeman, the context in
which the reasonableness analysis occurs must take account of the
73
value British society places on free expression.
Lord Lowry's opinion also reflected concern for the protection of
free expression:

68. Id. at 748-49 (emphasis added).
69. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). To justify a content-based restriction on political speech, the Supreme Court has "required the State to show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id. at 321 (quoting Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Assn, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). Justice Kennedy has
recently objected to the use of the "compelling state interest" test in cases involving contentbased restrictions on speech protected by the First Amendment. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 512-15 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,concurring).
70.
71.

Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas. at 750.
Id. at 751.

72.
73.

Id.
See id.at 749-50.
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[T]he inspiration for the applicants' argument, if not perhaps the
facts on which the argument is based, is closely linked with the
principle of freedom of speech in a democratic society, so far as
compatible with the safety of the state and the well-being of its
74
citizens, which may provide a reason for me to say something.
Lord Lowry concluded that the restrictions at issue imposed at most a
"modest" burden on freedom of expression." However, he emphasized that "administrative acts" which severely burdened free expression "might well be justified, but they would certainly deserve the
closest scrutiny.' '76
The remaining panel member, Lord Ackner, noted that "[i]n a field
which concerns a fundamental human right-namely that of free
speech-close scrutiny must be given to the reasons provided as justification for interference with that right." 7 7 Lord Ackner found that
"the extent of the interference with the right to freedlom of speech is a
very modest one, ' 78 and concluded that it was therefore reasonable.
Significantly, Lord Ackner appeared to place considerable reliance
on Parliament's subsequent affirmation of the Home Secretary's regulation. 79 Thus, for Lord Ackner, Parliament's overt approval of the
directive counted heavily against finding that the regulation was unreasonable.80 However, Lord Ackner's ultimate conclusion probably
stems as much from his conclusion that the directive's interference
with the right to free expression was minimal as from his respect for
Parliament's imprimatur. 8
3. Brind and the Limits of Unwritten Protectionsof Civil
Liberties
Brind demonstrates that the absence of a written provision protecting free expression does not bar consideration of speech interests as
either a "right" or a decisional "principle. '8 2 In Brind, three of the

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

79.
80.

Id. at 763.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 757.
Id.at 759.
Id. at 756, 758.

See id.at756, 758.

81. Id.at759.
82. Note that Lord Bridge, joined by Lord Roskill, and Lord Ackner refer to a right of free
expression. Id. at 749, 750, 757. However, Lord Templeman recognizes that "freedom of expression is a principle," id. at 750 (emphasis added); Lord Lowry also refers to freedom of

expression as a "principle." Id. at 763. Thus, three of the five lords on the panel characterized
"freedom of expression" as a "right."
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five law lords view free expression as a fundamental "right." All five
lords believe that when an administrator promulgates a regulation
which impinges on free expression, the regulation must receive
"close" or the "closest scrutiny" and/or further an "important public interest." Although one may quibble with the result that the lords
reach, the language they use along the way closely parallels the language of Supreme Court cases interpreting the First Amendment. 3
The limited scope of review applicable to the regulation at issue in
Brind did not prevent the lords from expounding on the administrator's need to have an important reason for exercising his discretion as
he did.8 4 Moreover, the law lords placed considerable emphasis on the
limited nature of the restriction at issue; the regulation merely precluded certain persons, under certain conditions, from directly spreading their message via broadcast media. Neither the message nor the
messenger were barred from the exercise of free speech in other fora.
Particularly compelling from the lords' perspective was the potential
for furthering acts of terrorism through in-person presentations by
representatives of the affected organizations.
Brind shows that the existence of a written legal provision protecting free expression is not a condition precedent to the consideration or
vindication of speech rights in a democratic society. The law lords are
prepared to hold as an abuse of discretion the more ambitious attempts by administrative decisionmakers to impose limits on free expression.85 To be sure, Brind only affords a modicum of protection to
free expression; Parliament is always free either to write a statute that
expressly confers discretion on an administrator to regulate expression
or simply to codify a particular restriction on free speech. Brind offers
no relief whatsoever in the face of an unambiguous parliamentary enactment.
Brind is significant not because it represents a "strong" free expression case, but rather because it shows that the British judiciary, left to
its own devices, will embrace free expression as a decisional norm
without any prodding from Parliament. Community tradition, rather
than legal fiat, provides the British judiciary with sufficient justifica-

83.

See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501

(1991); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota

Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
84. Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas. at 748-50, 757-59, 763.
85. For instance, should the Home Secretary prohibit the media from reporting on the political activities of Sinn Fein, it seems entirely probable that, under Brind, the House of Lords
would quash the regulation. Such hypothetical regulation would impose more than a minimal
restriction on freedom of expression, and would be extremely difficult to justify as serving a
"compelling" need.
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tion to create and police barriers against enforcement of restrictions
on free expression absent overt approval by Parliament. 8 6 The strong
and longstanding British community tradition in favor of permitting
any citizen to speak his piece constitutes, at least in the abstract, a
viable partial alternative to a legal right stemming from a textual
source.
B.

Rust and Limits of the FirstAmendment

Both superficially and in practice, free speech enjoys much greater
protection in the United States than in Great Britain. The modern Supreme Court's somewhat reflexive vindication of First Amendment
claims in many recent cases8 7 reflects a solicitude for free speech not
necessarily shared in other countries-including Great Britain.18 The
Court's willingness to vindicate speech rights is, of course, undeniably
a function of the Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 8 9
The existence of the First Amendment, however, does not necessarily mean that the federal courts will always or predictably vindicate
speech claims. 90 The First Amendment certainly requires the Supreme
Court to consider a speech claim on the merits, 91 but does not fore-

86. Suppose that Article 10 were domestically applicable in Britain. Would the result in
Brind necessarily change as a result? It seems doubtful, given Article 10's express sanction of
restrictions on free expression necessary to protect "national security," "public safety," and
"disorder or crime." ECHR, art. 10(2). The only real question would then be whether the regulation at issue was "necessary in a democratic society." Id. Given the limited scope of the regulation, it could be argued (perhaps successfully) that the social benefit conferred by the
regulation is so modest as to render the regulation unnecessary. But see Glimmerveen & Hagenbeck v. The Netherlands, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 260 (1979) (holding that The Netherlands could
prohibit racist political speech without violating Article 10's guarantee of free expression).
The fate of the regulation under Article 10 will soon be tested. The journalists who served as
plaintiffs in Brind intend to bring a complaint before the European Commission on Human
Rights, and, perhaps, bring suit before the European Court of Human Rights under Article 10.
gee Patricia Wynn Davies, Law Lords Uphold Media Bar on IRA, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 8, 1991,
at AI0.
87. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster Inc., 112 S. Ct. at 501; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988).
88. See WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT CASES AND MATERIALS 3-5, 14 (1st ed.
1991).
89. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2873, 2874-76, 2884-85
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that as a general matter only rights with a textual foundation in the Constitution should be enforced by courts); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-19
(1988) (holding that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment precludes a state from
permitting a minor to testify via closed circuit television set); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
541, 555-56 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that a
written constitution provides a greater degree of protection for enumerated rights).
90. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-78 (1968).
91. See KIrotoszynski, supra note 21, at 1448-49.
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close a result adverse to the. vindication of the claim. 92 The natural
question, then, is how much bite a textual provision entrenching
speech rights actually has. Put differently, absent the First Amendment, would the Supreme Court have decided a significant number of
its more important First Amendment precedents differently, or rather,
would the Court have vindicated the speech claims under some other
constitutional theory? 93
The House of Lords' decision in Brind suggests that speech rights
relate to sufficiently important community traditions9 4 to warrant solicitude by courts regardlessof the precise source of the interest in free
speech. Likewise, the Supreme Court's decision in Rust suggests that
even where a community's tradition of support for free speech is both
strong and codified in the foundational legal document, a sufficiently
politicized Court is quite capable of ignoring the textual provision.
1. Rust and the Failureof the Supreme Court to Vindicate Free
Expression
Rust v. Sullivan9" presented the question of whether certain administrative regulations promulgated by the executive branch of government were consistent with the free speech guarantee of the First
Amendment.9 The facts are relatively straightforward.
In 1970, Congress adopted a restriction on the expenditure of federal family planning appropriations. 7 Codified at section 300a-6 of
Title 42, the provision states that "[nione of the funds appropriated
under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a
method of family planning." 9

92.

See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1775-76 (1991).

93. An obvious candidate would be the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-486
(1965). Professor William Van Alstyne has suggested that free speech values could have been
imported into the Constitution through the Guaranty Clause, which provides that [tlhe United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government .... "
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. l; see VAN ALSTYNE, FIRsT AMENDMENT, supra note 6, at 8-9. To be

sure, the existence of the First Amendment Speech and Press Clauses most certainly help to
ensure that federal court judges will perk up and listen when a free speech claim is presented for
review. This does not necessarily mean, however, that such claims would fail to receive consideration on the merits absent the clauses.
94. This Article adverts to the "Anglo-American" tradition of law, and assumes for purposes of this endeavor that the people of the United States and Great Britain share a heritage
with significant common elements.
95. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
96. Id. at 1765-66.
97. H.R. CONy. REP. No. 1667, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5068,
5081-82 (1970); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (198 8).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988).
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In 1988, the Reagan Administration reinterpreted this provision and
promulgated a revised code of conduct for physicians participating in
the Title X program. 99 Under the regulations, a doctor could not mention the availability of abortion to women who participated in the Title X program.'00 Even if a pregnant patient asked about the
availability of abortion as a possible course of treatment, the attending physician could not counsel her in his best professional judgment. 0 1 Rather, the Reagan Administration required the doctor to say
that "the project does not consider abortion an appropriate method
of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion.' 02 Interestingly, the regulations expressly authorized physicians
to refer pregnant women for prenatal care. 03 Thus, the regulations
prohibited any discussion of abortion, ostensibly because abortion
was outside the terms of the project. At the same time, participating
clinics were required to refer patients for prenatal care, refuting any
claim that the Title X program's services ended once a woman became
pregnant.
Rust presented two discrete questions for review. The first related
to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) decision to
change its interpretation of section 300a-6.10 4 The second issue, the
question of the regulation's consistency with the First Amendment,
need only have been reached if the Court concluded that the change in
HHS policy had been adequately justified. 05 The majority concluded
°
that HHS had justified its change of policy under section 300a-6,' 0
and therefore decided the First Amendment claims.
The First Amendment issue was relatively simple: Could the federal
government condition participation in the Title X program on compliance with the administration's speech regulations? The Supreme
Court answered in the affirmative.'0
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned that the
government was not required to subsidize all speech equally.' ° He
opined that "[t]he Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it be-

99. Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1765-66.
100. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1992). On his first day in office, President Clinton repealed
these regulations. See 58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (Feb. 5, 1993).
101. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1992).
102. Id.
103. 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.8(b)(1), (5) (1992).
104. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1767-69 (1991).
105. Id. at 1778-80 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 1788-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1769.
107. Id. at 1771-76.
108. Id. at 1772-73.
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lieves to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an
alternate program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way."'' 9 The Chief Justice observed that in exercising its taxing and
spending powers, Congress could legitimately favor one kind of
speech over another to further an otherwise legitimate policy choice. " 0
The Rust majority also rejected the petitioners' argument that the
regulations violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.", Under
the doctrine, government may not condition the conferral of a valuable governmental benefit on the ceding of some otherwise protected
right or liberty."'2 Put differently, the government may not use its largesse "to produce a result which [it] could not command directly.""' 3
The petitioners argued the regulations at issue impermissibly required
participating clinics to cede their speech rights regarding the right to
choose abortion to obtain the valuable benefit of Title X funds."14 The
Rust Court turned this objection aside simply by noting that participating clinics were free to exercise their speech rights as they wished,
so long as they did not use Title X funds to promote abortion.'
The Court also rejected the petitioners' argument that the regulations unduly burdened physicians' ability to discharge in good conscience their professional duties."16 The majority declined to decide
whether doctors possessed a protected First Amendment interest in
communicating with their patients because the regulations did not require the doctors to represent the forced speech as their own.' 7 According to the majority, women who relied on Title X clinics for
competent, professional medical advice did not rely on the clinic doctors for comprehensive medical counselling because "the doctor-patient relationship established by the Title X program [is not]
sufficiently all-encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the
part of the patient of comprehensive medical advice.""'
Finally, the majority determined that a woman's Fifth Amendment
right to an abortion was not implicated by the government's decision
not to subsidize abortion counseling incident to family planning services."19 Because the government is not obliged to subsidize a woman's

109.
110.
Il1.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1772.
Id. at 1773&n.4.
See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926).
See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1774.
Id. at 1774-75.
Id. at 1776.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1776-78.
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fundamental right to choose abortion, the government is likewise not
required to subsidize counselling services related to that right. 20
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, took issue with every step of the majority's analysis. 2' For present purposes, this Article will examine
only the dissent's analysis of the majority's treatment of the speech
22
related claims.
First, Justice Blackmun found that the regulations violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by conditioning a valuable governmental benefit on the ceding' of protected speech rights. 23 His
principal objection was with the majority's assertion that the government was simply subsidizing certain kinds of services and speech incident to those services. 24 The regulations did not prohibit-indeed they
encouraged 2 -speech favorable to carrying the fetus to term. Thus,
the regulations only prohibited speech by Title X clinics relating to
abortion and abortion services. 26
Second, Justice Blackmun took issue with the majority's analysis of
doctors' interest in providing full medical disclosure to their patients. 27 He reasoned that if the government could circumscribe a doctor's professional speech as a condition of receiving government
funds, "the First Amendment could be read to tolerate any governmental restriction upon an employee's speech so long as that restric28
tion is limited to the funded workplace."1

120. Id. at 1777.
121. Id. at 1778-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. The task at hand is not to establish the general injustice of the Rust decision, but rather
to demonstrate that the existence of a written constitutional provision expressly protecting free
speech made little difference to the outcome of the case.
123. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1780-82; see Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271
U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926).
124. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1781-82, 1781 n.2.
125. 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.8(a), (b) (1992).
126. Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1782.
127. Id. at 1782-84.
128. Id. at 1783 (emphasis in original). A hypothetical helps to illustrate Justice Blackmun's
concerns. Suppose a law school professor at a state-funded institution teaches the introductory
course in constitutional law. Suppose further that the governor and state legislature decide to
appropriate funds for the express purpose of providing instruction in constitutional law at the
publicly funded state law school. To make the picture complete, we need only hypothesize that
as a condition of the grant, which any instructor at the law school is free to accept or reject as
she pleases, the instructor must teach that the equal protection doctrine of "separate but equal"
as set forth in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), is the only correct interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) and Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), which hold otherwise, were incorrectly decided and reflect the basest form of judicial usurpation. Relatively settled law on the
First Amendment and academic freedom would, until Rust, have presumably precluded either
the federal or a state government from so limiting the professional activities of our hypothetical
constitutional law instructor. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312
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Rust and the Non-Applicability of the FirstAmendment

For present purposes, Rust is significant primarily for its holding
that the government's gag on a physician's speech to further a policy
favoring childbirth was constitutional. 2 9 More specifically, the question of the level of scrutiny brought to bear on the restriction deserves
close attention. Presumably, the First Amendment must have mandated that the Court examine with "closest scrutiny" 5 0 such a restriction. Alternatively, the Court could have required the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to justify the restriction on a physician's
professional speech under a slightly less rigorous test-perhaps the
Secretary need only have proffered "an important competing public
interest."'

Careful review of the majority's decision reveals that the government had virtually no burden to meet-the government was free to
pursue the policy without any constitutional impediment, even though
the method of implementing the policy had a profound impact on the
a2
speech rights of physicians participating in the Title X program.'
Justice Blackmun failed to target the most troubling turn of logic in
the majority's approach: the absence of any statement regarding the
level of scrutiny to which the Court would subject the proposed regulation as it related to a physician's professional speech. 33
Apparently, the government is free, incident to a policy choice to
subsidize family planning but not abortion, to restrict professional
speech incident to the subsidized services without meeting any level of
(1978) (Opinion of Powell, J.); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1967); see
also Van Alstyne, HistoricalReview, supra note 16, at 112-14.
The Rust majority declined to decide whether a medical doctor acting in a professional capacity enjoys the same First Amendment protection of his professional speech as an academician,
because the regulations "do not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship.
Nothing in them requires a doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact
hold." Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776. Under this rationale, so long as a university professor was not
required to represent particular viewpoints as her own-i.e., so long as she could at least marginally disassociate herself from them outside the classroom-the state may force her to abdicate
her professional duties and academic integrity. Whether this is a salutary doctrine in First
Amendment jurisprudence seems, at best, dubious. Cf. Young Women's Christian Ass'n of
Princeton v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1063 (D.N.J. 1972); Van Alstyne, HistoricalReview,
supra note 16, at 153-54.
129. Rust, I11 S. Ct. at 1776.
130. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Brind, 11991] 1 App. Cas.
696, 763 (appeal taken from C.A.); see also Brind, [19911 1 App. Cas. at 757 (calling for "close

scrutiny").
131. Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas. at 749.
132. See Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1776 (requiring no justification for the restriction on a treating
physician's speech).
133. Id. at 1782-84. Justice Blackmun quibbles merely with the result, and not with the particular means to the result.
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scrutiny. "[Tihe general rule that the Government may choose not to
subsidize speech applies with full force."'13 4 Thus, a person whose
speech is restricted incident to an otherwise legitimate governmental
program has no First Amendment interest in maintaining his or her
speech rights while on duty. If the government subsidizes A, and a
person paid by the government to provide A feels a professional obligation to tell the putative recipient of A that he or she might wish to
consider the possibility of B, that is just too bad. The government has
no obligation to explain or to justify why it chose to preclude any
discussion of B, even if in the professional judgment of the person
providing A, mention of B seems mandatory.' 35 Likewise, a patient
36
has no protected First Amendment interest in hearing the speech.
Where is the First Amendment in all this? Apparently, it simply has
no application on these facts.' 7 Under the First Amendment, "Con-

134. Id. at 1776.
135. This actually implicates two speech interests: (1) the interest of the professional when
performing duties to do so in a fashion consistent with prevailing professional standards of care,
and (2) the recipient's interest in receiving the information. On the first point, see Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala.
1970), on the second, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748. 756, 757 & n.15 (1976). For whatever reason, Justice Blackmun's Rust
dissent largely ignores the patient's interest in receiving accurate and complete medical information. See Rust, 111 S.Ct. at 1782 n.3, 1783. Yet, the Rust majority's approach entirely discounts
the patient's interest in full disclosure with the offhanded observation that "[tjhe program does
not provide post-conception medical care, and therefore a doctor's silence with regard to abortion cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor does not
consider abortion an appropriate option for her." Id. at 1776. This approach is troublesome for
several reasons.
First, its factual premises are flawed: why would it be "unreasonable" for a patient who
discovers that she is pregnant to assume that her doctor's silence on the question of abortion
reflects a negative determination about the abortion procedure in her case? Moreover, if a patient has doubts about the desirability or appropriateness of an abortion and asks about abortion, the treating physician is required under the regulations to tell her that "abortion [is not] an
appropriate method of family planning." 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1992). Thus, if a patient asks
about abortion, any doubts she has regarding the possibility of obtaining an abortion are to be
answered in a fashion suggesting that the option is not a viable one.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the government has not been put to any test regarding
this restriction on the doctor's right to speak and the patient's right to hear. Cf.Rust, Ill S. Ct.
at 1776 ("We need not resolve [the First Amendment] question here ...

because Title X pro-

gram regulations do not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship."). The
Court is prepared to accept the restriction without any substantive justification regarding either
its necessity or appropriateness. Id.
136. Compare Virginia State Bd.of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756-57 (holding that any First
Amendment protection enjoyed by advertisers seeking to disseminate prescription drug price information also is enjoyed by the recipients of such information and therefore may be asserted by
the recipients) with Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776 (holding that the doctor-patient relationship does
not justify an expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive medical advice from a
doctor in a government-funded clinic).
137. See Rust, 111 S.Ct. at 1776.
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gress shall make no law .

.

. abridging the freedom of speech."' 38 It

necessarily follows that Congress cannot delegate to the executive
branch the task of making a law abridging the freedom of speech and
thereby achieve indirectly what it could not itself do. Yet, this is precisely the action the Supreme Court sanctions in Rust. 3 9 So, a written
constitutional provision that ostensibly protects both the right to
speak' 4 and the right to hear 41 may be abrogated at will if the government is subsidizing the forum in which the restriction is to apply.
Rust strongly demonstrates the limits of a written constitution; a
textual right is only as powerful as the resolve of those charged with

enforcing
III.

it.142

BRIND,

RUST AND THE LIUTS OF WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS

Viewing Brind and Rust in juxtaposition, one might wonder which
tribunal was working with a stronger legal protection of free speech.
The House of Lords subjected the Home Secretary to a far more
probing review of the broadcasting restriction than the Supreme Court
required of the Secretary of Health and Human Services in Rust. This
result is at least mildly surprising, especially if one has faith in the
power of written constitutional protections.
The restrictions on freedom of expression at issue in Brind and Rust
are not much different qualitatively. 143 Both involve administrative re-

138.

U.S. CoNsT. amend. 1.

139. Whether Congress intended 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988) to impose the "gag" rule is open
to doubt, if the Congressional hostility to the regulation was any indication. See Title X Pregnancy Counseling Act of 1991, S. 323, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991); Family Planning
Amendments Act, H.R. 3090, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991); see 138 CONG. Rlc. H 2,822-51
(Apr. 30, 1992) (House debate on H.PK. 3090); 138 CoNG. REC. H 10,667-77 (Oct. 2, 1992)
(House debate on override of presidential veto of S. 323). Senate Bill 323 passed both houses,
but, citing Rust in support of his position, then-President Bush vetoed the bill on September 25,
1992. 138 CoNG. REC. H 10,667 (Oct. 2, 1992). Although the Senate voted to override the President's veto by a margin of 73 to 26, see 138 CONG. REc. H 10,667, the House failed to muster
the required two-thirds majority override vote. 138 CoNG. Rac. H 10,678 (recording vote of 266
in favor and 148 opposed to override). President Clinton subsequently overturned the ban on his
first day in office, Jan. 21, 1993. See 58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (Feb. 5, 1993).
140. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 17, 22-23 (1971) (jacket bearing the
message "Fuck the Draft" protected, even if carried in a courthouse); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (speech advocating violent overthrow of the government protected); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1949) (noting that racist, fascist speech is protected).
141. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 756-57 (1976).
142. See VAN ALSrYNE, FiRST AMENDMENT, supranote 6, at 47-49.
143. See supra notes 48-56, 95-103 and accompanying text.
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gulations used to implement ambiguous statutes, 144 both regulations
proscribe certain kinds of speech deemed unworthy of government
subsidy,'4 and both in a concrete way deny the right of free expression to those regulated. Finally, the results are roughly analogous.
The shock value of comparing the two cases stems from the absence
of a written constitutional protection for free speech in the case of
Brind and the existence of such a provision in Rust.
Beyond irony, Rust and Brind invite two questions: First, upon
what legal basis did the House of Lords import the value of free expression evidenced in the Brind decision. Second, upon what legal basis did the Supreme Court abdicate its responsibilities under the First
Amendment in Rust. This Article will examine each of these questions
in turn.
A.

Brind and JudicialA ctivism

The opinions in Brind reflect a rare burst of judicial activism by the
lords. ' On their own and without parliamentary sanction, 47 the lords
took upon themselves the task of safeguarding the English citizenry's
right to free expression by incorporating a moderate-to-strong free
speech value into the rational basis test used to review administrative
acts. ' Despite their protestations to the contrary, 4 9 the lords required
more than mere rationality to justify the regulation. 50 In doing this,
however, the lords acted legitimately.
Although there is no written provision in English law that guarantees freedom of expression,'5 ' there is a tradition in Britain of respecting the right of free expression. This is not to say that this tradition
has always prevailed over popular sentiments favoring the abrogation
of the right.5 2 Nor is it to suggest that the tradition favoring free

144.
145.

See Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 29(3) (Eng.); 42 U.S.C. § 300a-(6) (1988).
In the case of Brind, speech by official representatives of the designated entities carried

by government-supported media; in the case of Rust, speech regarding the availability of abortions spoken by physicians whose clinics receive government support.
146. Traditionally, the British judiciary is loathe to engage in anything even arguably activist
in nature. Krotoszynski, supra note 21, at 1411-13.
147. Indeed, the lords held forth despiteexpress Parliamentary approval of the Home Secretary's directive. See Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Brind, [1991] 1
App. Cas. 696, 715 (C.A.) (noting that on Nov. 2, 1988, the House of Commons approved a
motion by a vote of 243 to 179 that "this House approves the Home Secretary's action").
148. Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas. at 748-49, 750, 757-58, 763.
149. Id. at748-49, 763.
150. For an excellent example of a court honestly applying a true "mere rationality" standard of review, see Rust v. Sullivan, I I I S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991).
151. VAN ALSTYNE, Fs"T AMENDMENT, supra note 6, at 47-48.
152. See Graham Zellick, Spies, Subversives, Terrorists and the British Government: Free
Speech and Other Casualties, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 773 (1990).
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speech is a sure substitute for a written guarantee of free speech; it is
not."' Rather, it would seem that the absence of a written guarantee
of freedom of expression does not mean the individual's interest in
free expression will be denied routinely and without recourse. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the absence of a written guarantee
of free expression may be irrelevant in some cases, provided that an
independent judiciary is prepared to consider on the merits the society's tradition favoring free expression. To be sure, a written provision
guaranteeing freedom of expression would afford British citizens a
greater and more predictable degree of protection. 5 4 However, the
question is one of degree rather than substance.
B.

Rust and JudicialAbdication

A written constitutional provision guaranteeing freedom of speech
is of little use if the judiciary charged with enforcing the provision
abdicates its responsibilities. Rust is an example of such judicial abdication. Regardless of where one stands on the merits of the regulation, it cannot be denied that the restriction on a doctor's right to
impart medical information and the patient's interest in receiving such
information merited closer scrutiny by the majority under the First
Amendment. However, the Rust majority was content to apply a de
facto rational basis standard of review when examining the speech
limitations. 151
The Rust majority did not misconstrue the First Amendment, but
rather simply decided not to apply it to the case at hand.5 6 Using
faulty factual premises and non sequiturs, the majority decided that
neither the physician nor the patient had any free speech interest in
speech related to abortion in a government-sponsored family planning
clinic.5 7

153. See Krotoszynski, supra note 21; at 1431-32; VAN AI.STYNE, FisTSI AMENDMENT, supra
note 6, at 1-6, 11-16; see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (permitting newspapers to publish sensitive government papers on First Amendment grounds; no
comparable British decision exists); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment restricts the application of the common law of libel to newspapers;
no comparable British decision exists).
154. An easy way to accomplish this object would be through the incorporation of the
ECHR into British domestic law. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte
Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas. 696, 761-62 (appeal taken from C.A.); see also Krotoszynski, supra
note 21, at 1449-53.
155. See Rust v. Sullivan, III S. CI. 1759, 1776(1991).
156. Id.
157. Id. Essentially, the majority endorsed the government's position that speech about
abortion, in the context of a doctor-patient relationship, was not relevant to the service provided
by a Title X family planning clinic. This is akin to saying that speech about God is irrelevant in a
church.
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The Rust majority's approach to the free speech claim reflects a
different kind of activism from that in Brind-namely judicial abdication. 5 8 By refusing to apply the Court's well-settled First Amendment
analysis, the majority was able to reach the result it desired in the
most expeditious fashion. In the majority's haste to uphold the gag
rule, the First Amendment became an irrelevancy.
C. Critical Legal Studies and Indeterminacy
The novelty of Brind and Rust may have some currency beyond the
straightforward point that written constitutions have their limits, and
unwritten societal traditions can help inform decisional principles in
appropriate cases. One of the main projects of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement has been the indeterminacy problem. "[Tihe indeterminacy argument [holds] that within the standard resources of
legal argument [are] the materials for reaching sharply contrasting results in particular instances."'' 9 According to some in the CLS movement, "law is indeterminate at its core, in its inception, not just in its

applications."

16

Brind and Rust seem to support the CLS claim that "law is indeterminate at its core." After all, if law at the constitutionallevel is little
more than the expressed policy preferences of a handful of elites wearing black robes, then there is little hope for determinacy at any
level.' 6' Arguably, a legal system's constitutional provisions-its foundational principles-should be the surest place to find stability and
determinism. If judges are free to disregard fundamental laws at will,
then they are likely to be free to disregard more mundane ordinances
with impunity.
A reexamination of Brind and Rust with an eye toward the CLS
indeterminacy argument will carry the main thesis of this Articlethat written constitutions are helpful but unnecessary to vindication of

158.

For other examples of this phenomenon, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)

(holding that statute requiring trains to provide separate but equal accommodations for white
and black citizens was constitutional); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)
(holding that state regulation requiring public school students to recite the pledge of allegiance
was constitutional); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that a military
order which directed Japanese Americans to leave their homes, which were located in a West
Coast military area, was constitutional).
159. See Tushnet, CLS, supranote 19, at 1524.
160.

Robert W. Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories,36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 114 (1984).

161.

Of course, the question whether the determinacy game is worth the candle is open to

question. See Robert Lipkin, Indeterminacy, Justification, and Truth in ConstitutionalTheory,

60 FoxDaA L. REv. 595, 619-623, 642-43 (1992) (criticizing the determinacy/indeterminacy paradigm as unhelpful to meaningful analysis of constitutional adjudication).
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rights-a step further. Moreover, the indeterminacy argument helps to
explain, at least in part, the results in Brind and Rust.
1.

The IndeterminacyArgument

Some members of the CLS school argue that legal rules are indeterminate, 6 2 and that principled decisionmaking cannot exist because its
foundation-neutral, normative rules-does not exist. 163
CLS holds that because the participants in the present legal system
have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, they refuse to
recognize that the system of rules constituting the law is nothing but a
subjective exercise by judges, who rely on the intellectual equivalent
of smoke and mirrors to reach politically pleasing results.'6 As Professor Spann has explained, for many non-CLS adherents "any lingering dissonance between faith in the system's general fairness and
perceptions of unfairness in particular cases is resolved through the
conviction that while unjust results may constitute imperfections in
practice, they do not undermine the theory of principled decision
making itself."16 The process of legal decision making confers legitimacy on the decision; a particular case may be resolved in any number
of ways, so long as proper process is observed.
Under this world view, those who maintain a belief in principled
decision making have failed to accept the basic truth that the legal
system is actually a chaotic place where principle routinely falls to political preference. As a result, such persons are guilty of complicity in
the continuing disempowerment of various groups, including women,
minorities, and the poor.' Not only is the law indeterminate, but the
fiction of principled decision making is merely a ruse used to hide the
exercise of political power. 67
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, many in CLS circles generally reject the construct of "rights" as a helpful means of identifying
and protecting discrete minority interests.' CLS adherents seem to

Tushnet, CLS, supra note 19, at 1524, 1538-39.
Spann, supra note 19, at 1734-39; see MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CamCAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 46-52 (1988) [hereinafter TUSHNET, RED WHITE AND
162.
163.

BLUE].

164. See Spann, supra note 19, at 1735; cf. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 6,
at 14-16 (arguing that process can legitimate judicial decision making).
165. See Spann, supra note 19, at 1736.
166. Id. at 1736-38; see also TUSHNET, RED WHITE AND BLUE, supra note 163, at 197-202;
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of Our Constitution is Colorblind, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1991);
Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1, 33-41 (1984).
167.

See TUSHNET, RED WHITE AND BLUE, supra note 163, at 51-52.

168.

Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 166, at 33-34. Gabel and Kennedy explain this aspect of
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view rights as merely one more tool for vindicating the policy preferences of the established ruling caste. 169 More subtly, some within the
CLS movement argue that rights discourse emphasizes and helps to
perpetuate an impersonal world in which individuals are needlessly alienated from the community of which they are inextricably a part. 170
Given the foregoing premises, one may hypothesize that a CLS critique of Brind and Rust would probably run along the following lines:
(1) Because the law is fundamentally indeterminate and judges are
essentially political policymakers, judges are unconstrained and are
unconstrainable;
(2) It follows necessarily that it is not in the least surprising that the
Supreme Court would largely ignore the First Amendment in Rust,
the CLS canon as follows:
Duncan
What do you mean there are no rights?
Peter
They don't exist. They have no existence. They are shared, imaginary attributes that
the group attributes to its members that don't in fact exist. It's a hallucination. Moreover, the group itself is not constituted. There is no constituted group here, that is in
fact acting in any way that we should consider .... There is no group discussion;
there is no shared power among people generating forms of consensus about social
reality. Yet there are thousands of classes each year in "constitutional law" that pretend that such a constituted group exists.
[Tlhe way it happens with lawyers is that lawyers are far down the ladder from the
political theory. They are taught the presuppositions of the democratic political theory
without ever in fact engaging in hardly any discussion of whether those presuppositions or what they're based on are true. So they're taught at a purely technical level
how to manipulate things that are presupposed, such as that the Constitution is a
democratic document, based on the will of the people. Nobody gets to discuss that.
Instead, you learn constitutional law, which has good things in it like freedom of
speech and equal protection. But all of which relegitimizes the idea that there is currently existing a political group, a group in fusion, that is developing forms of shared
meaning that is what people want. That is the false consciousness. That does not exist.
In fact, it is invented by people in the service of maintaining their fear and anxiety
about really developing such a political group, because they choose to believe it, and
it's not true.
Id. at 34-35. Thus, under this view, constitutional law is little more than a sham to justify the
ruling class's continued empowerment, and the sham maintains itself by representing itself as a
reflection of the values of a common culture.
169. Id. This criticism of rights includes attacks on the First Amendment Speech Clause.
Gotanda, supra note 166, at 11. Most recently, CLS adherents have objected to constitutionally
imposed impediments, based on First Amendment considerations, to prohibitions against socalled "hate speech" on university campuses. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.I. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim'sStory, 87 MIcH. L. RE. 2320 (1989). Indeed, some in the CLS movement appear to reject the utility of written legal rules, even at the
constitutional level, believing instead that some sort of communitarian discourse can more effectively resolve disputed matters. See TusHNET, RED WHrrE AND BLUE, supra note 163, at 317.
170. See Lawrence C. George, Asking the Right Questions, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 449
(1987).
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nor is it surprising that the House of Lords would give voice to free
speech values absent a textual referent compelling consideration of
such values;
(3) Brind and Rust merely demonstrate that law is largely a function
72
of politics,' 7' a point that CLS has been explaining for years.
A CLS critique of Brind and Rust certainly raises troubling possibilities about the nature of judges and judging. Judges free to ignore a
constitutional provision they dislike or free to create a provision they
deem desirable do not fit the determinist's mold of the neutral adjudicator. But does the play inherent in legal rules, even those with constitutional pedigrees, necessarily mean that the rules are not "rules" or
that blessing them with a constitutional mandate is at best superfluous
and at worst ludicrous? There is reason for some optimism that law is
not merely politics.
2.

Living with Indeterminacy in ConstitutionalAdjudication

Even if courts remain theoretically free to disregard constitutional
mandates, such action does not entirely devalue the use of written decisional rules. 7 3 Moreover, the recognition and application of strong
community traditions when applying legal rules need not be a cause
for alarm. This is true for at least two reasons.
First, the existence of a written provision forces the judiciary to act,
to respond to the provision, however disingenuously. Even when a
court seemingly refuses to apply a particular constitutional provision
fairly,7 4 a court faced with a constitutional claim is obliged to explain
itself. That is to say that the existence of a written constitutional provision at least nominally circumscribes judicial policy-making by forcing the decisionmaker to at least nod and wink at the ostensibly
controlling provision; a written constitutional provision establishes a
process through which the claim to a particular right may be raised
and heard (if not vindicated). 7 In more ideal circumstances, the judi-

171. See generally Gotanda, supra note 166, at 11,62-63; Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 166,
at 33-41; Gordon, supra note 160, at 93-96, 114-16.
172. Gordon, supra note 160, at 93.
173. Cf. TuSHNET, RED WWTE AND BLUE, supra note 163, at 51-52, 197-202, 317.
174.

See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991).

See id.; see also VAN AISTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 6, at 11-17; HERBERT
WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 20-22 (1961); Herbert Wechsler, To175.

ward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAirv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
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ciary will simply enforce the provision in good faith. 7 6 Thus, the existence of the written provision, whether it is enforced in good faith or
is merely an impediment to a result the court deems desirable, has a
predictable and reliable effect on the outcome of concrete cases. To
17
the extent indeterminacy exists, it is cabined. 1
Second, there is nothing inherently indeterminate or illegitimate
about judges relying on well-established traditions in society when applying and developing legal rules.'78 Problems of legitimacy and indeterminacy arise only when judges resort to tradition as the primary
means of discerning the relevant decisional principle, even in the face
79
of an ostensibly relevant and controlling written legal command.
Reconsidered in light of the foregoing, Rust appears to be a poorly
crafted decision. Even if the result in Rust is correct as a matter of

176. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501,
512 (1991). The Supreme Court decided Simon & Schuster in same Term as Rust, and the result
enjoyed the endorsement of a unanimous Court. Likewise, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988), exemplifies the Court enforcing the First Amendment in good faith.
As with Simon & Schuster, the Court was of a single mind in Falwell. See Simon, 112 S. Ct. at
512.
177. Cf. Tushnet, CLS, supra note 19, at 1538-39. Tushnet argues that the real dispute
within the academy is not whether indeterminacy exists-he suggests (correctly) that all sides
agree that it does-but rather focuses on the level of indeterminacy within the system. CLS
adherents argue that the level of indeterminacy is quite high, whereas the more traditionally
minded folks believe that determinate results obtain fairly frequently. Id.
178. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (recognizing the sanctity of the family in holding that an ordinance which did not allow certain categories of relatives
to live together was unconstitutional); see also Phillip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1233, 1309 (1989) ("[Tlhe liberal tradition (taking that to be the tradition of our Constitution and its construction) [ I not only permits but requires [the] judges and-presidents and members of Congress [to] resort to their consciences when, having scrupulously followed the modes
that ensure legitimization, [a conflict remains]").
179. The Constitution provides that no state shall deprive any of its citizens "equal protection" of the laws. Thus, if a state attempted to deny black citizens the right to vote, such a
restriction would be unlawful even if the state had a tradition of denying its black citizens the
vote. Compare Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (holding that the denial of the right to
vote to a black citizen pursuant to the rules of the state's Democratic Party did not implicate
state action and therefore did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments) with Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that Democratic Party election machinery denied the right
to vote to citizens on the basis of race in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that the denial of the right- to vote to a black citizen in a
Democratic primary violated the Fifteenth Amendment). Turning to the use of tradition, a court
presented with a case challenging the hypothesized law would act illegitimately if it upheld the
regulation on the basis of the community tradition, the Equal Protection Clause notwithstanding. Recourse to tradition should occur only after the relevant decisional principle has been selected; tradition does not itself provide the decisional principle. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that due process of law is the relevant decisional principle); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the Ninth Amendment is the
relevant decisional principle).

1994]

FREE SPEECH

First Amendment law, 80 the majority did not explain or justify its
failure to take up the primary First Amendment question on the merits. However, the radical indeterminacy suggested by some in the CLS
school is not entirely borne out. First, the majority was constrained to
at least explain (however unconvincingly) why the First Amendment
was not implicated by either the physician's professional relationship
with his patient or by the patient's interest in hearing the speech.' 8'
Second, the lack of indeterminacy in this area of the law is precisely
what allows the disinterested observer to see the error in the majority's analysis. If the law were truly indeterminate, a "correct" result
should not be obvious. That a given case may be wrongly decided for
political reasons does not prove that the law itself is fundamentally
political. Rather, it demonstrates that although the law is itself not
fundamentally indeterminate, those charged with enforcing it may create indeterminate results by declining to decide a given case consistently with the law.' 82
From a legal process perspective, Brind fares considerably better
than Rust. In Brind, the lords did not stray from the discrete task at
hand: deciding whether a reasonable Home Secretary could reasonably adopt the regulation. 3 However, after having identified the correct decisional principle, i.e. the "reasonableness" test, the lords had
to decide how that principle should be applied on the facts of the case.
When applying the requisite legal test, the lords had recourse to the
English tradition in favor of freedom of expression.1 4 Tradition did

180. A dubious proposition, at best. See Van Alstyne, HistoricalReview, supra note 16, at
93-97, 112-18; see also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 609-10 (1967); Young Women's Christian Ass'n of Princeton v.
Kugler, 342 F'. Supp. 1048, 1063 (D.N.J. 1972); see generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166
(1973).
181. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991).
182. Perhaps the best example of this kind of turn about occurred in the flag-salute cases,
Gobitis and Barnette: Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding a West
Virginia law which required all students in the public schools to participate in a daily recitation
of the pledge of allegiance); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (reversing its three-year-old precedent). Had President Clinton not mooted the issue, the Supreme
Court would ultimately have reconsidered its decision in Rust. A doctor's interest in her professional speech is no less important, and therefore should be no less protected, than an academic's
interest in academic freedom. See generally Roe, 410 U.S. at 163, 166 (noting that "the abortion
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility
for it must rest with the physician. " (emphasis added)); see also Van Alstyne, HistoricalReview,
supra note 16, at 86-87 (describing the origins of academic freedom as beginning in Germany to
protect scientific endeavor from ecclesiastical meddling).
183. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Brind, [1991] 1 App. Cas.
696, 748-49, 757, 763 (appeal taken from C.A.).
184. Id. at 748-49, 750, 763; see Hubbard v. Pitt, [1976] Q.B. 142, 178 (Eng.) (Denning,
Lord, dissenting); COLIN TUR.PIN, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 91-94 (1985); see
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not supplant the decisional principle, but rather informed its application. Thus, the lords were not creating a new right out of thin air, but
rather were attempting to apply the law in a fashion consistent with
community norms, in the absence of a contrary legal command. Such
action should lead to predictable results in similar cases, assuming the
lords access the community's tradition at the same level of generality."' In any case, Brind cannot be fairly characterized as an example
of a wild-eyed judiciary making up the law to suit its tastes; Brind is
an example of conscientious judges attempting to find an acceptable
context in which to place a decisional rule.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Brind and Rust together help to show the limits of a written constitution and the possibilities of an unwritten constitution. Along the
way, they also help highlight the importance of principled decision
making by judges if there is to be determinacy in the law. To the extent that Rust is disturbing for its lack of principled decision making,
Brind is to the same degree a cause for hope.

also STRET, supra note 1, at 96-97 (describing lapse of press restrictions from 1695 to 1945); see
generally MICHAEL ZANDER, A BILL OF RIGHTS?, 43-47 (3rd ed. 1985); Jolowicz, supra note 29, 510, 43-47.
185. See Krotoszynski, supra note 21, at 1440-42; Edward Gary Spitko, Note, A Critique of
Justice Antonin Scalia'sApproach to FundamentalRights Adjudication, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1337,
1348-59.

